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A joint strategy (f, g) induces two sequences {x}fU, i = 1,2, of numbers, where x is the payoff of player i at stage t. 
Upper correlated equilibrium. An upper correlated equilibrium is a tuple

The lower correlated equilibrium. The lower correlated equilibrium is defined as the upper one with the change that liminf replaces limsup in (lb) and (Ic).
Denote by LCEP the set of all lower correlated equilibrium payoffs. Obviously UCEP c LCEP. The lower and the upper equilibria differ in the way an infinite stream of payoffs is evaluated by the players. The former corresponds to "pessimistic" players taking into account the worst averages they are about to experience, while the latter assumes "optimistic" players for which the best periods matter most. 177 The choice of the particular pure strategies is done by functions oa and r. These choice functions are in equilibrium if any other player's choice function would not increase his expected payoff in the repeated game, evaluated with either the upper, lower, Banach limit, or sufficiently large partial averages (which correspond to uniform equilibrium). In this example, 21 = {al, a2, a3, a4}, 2 = {b, b2, b3 b4} and Li {A, 77, y, , A', 77', E}, i = 1,2. If, for instance, PI played a2 and PII played b1, the payoffs are 7 and 2 for PI and PII, respectively, and the signals are 71 and A for PI and PII, respectively. REMARK 1. In the framework described here the players are not allowed to randomize. Any randomization, if and when it takes place, should be provided by the mediator. However, all the messages are given to the players before starting the 178 game. Therefore, the message should contain a random signal on which the players base their actions when the need of randomization arises (e.g., in case of punishment or in a case where a random stage is chosen). For our purposes it will be enough if player i will get in addition to previously mentioned messages also a string ( In the sequel, when it is said that a player randomizes, it should be understood as a player bases his action on the random message he got from the mediator.
2.
8. An extensive form correlated equilibrium. As opposed to the correlated equilibrium, where the mediator correlates between the players only before the game starts, we consider here a mediator who is active at all stages. Before stage t the mediator selects a message (a,, pt) E (At, Bt) according to a probability distribution Pt, which may depend on his previous selected messages {(a,, P3)} <t,. Relying on all the signals and messages previously received, a player chooses an action to be played at stage t. For a more elaborate study see [F1] and [F2] .
Precisely, an upper extensive form correlated equilibrium is a tuple (( X = A,) x (X = Bt), 'x 9, P, f, g), where:
(i) (( X A,) x (X t Bt), V.x ., P) is a product sample space;
(ii) f = (f1, f2,...), where ft is a measurable function from L -l x A, x * * x A, to El; and (iii) g = (g1, g2,...), where gt is a measurable function from L'~-x B1 x .. x Bt to Y2, satisfying convergence and incentive compatibility conditions. Namely, having the properties (la)-(lc), replacing a with f, r with g, a with f, and r with g.
Similarly, lower, uniform and Banach extensive form correlated equilibria can be defined. In the sequel, an asterisk attached to a correlated equilibrium payoffs set will indicate that the set corresponds to extensive form correlated equilibrium.
Notice that any correlated equilibrium payoff is an extensive form correlated equilibrium payoff (UECP c UECP*, LECP c LECP*, UNIC c UNIC*, and CEPL c CEPL ), but the opposite, typically, is incorrect. The following game, quoted from [M] , is an example in which there is an extensive form correlated equilibrium payoff that is not a correlated equilibrium payoff. 
179
A mediator recommends to PI at the first node to choose -t. After PI has made his choice, the mediator picks either (m, 1) or (b, r), with probability 2 each. If the former was the outcome, he recommends PI to play m and PII to play 1, and if the latter was the outcome he recommends b to PI and r to PII.
Notice that after the choice of -t has been made (and then t is no longer available), neither player can gain by disobeying the mediator's recommendations, provided that the other player obeys them. The expected payoff of this correlation mechanism is 3 for both players.
However, (3, 3) cannot be achieved as a correlated equilibrium payoff, because PI would not be willing to play consecutively -t and then b (and get the payoff 1) if he can play the dominating action t (and get the payoff 2).
3. The main theorems. In order to state the main results, a few notations are needed. An action a is strictly less informative than a' if a' is more informative than a and a is not more informative than a'. EXAMPLE 3. In Example 1, al and a2 are indistinguishable, while a, and a4 are distinguishable. In the same example a2 is more informative than a3, while a3 is not more informative than a2, because by playing a2 PI can distinguish between b3 and b4, while he cannot do so by playing a3. i.e., hl(QIao) and h2(Qlbo) are the unnormalized (the probabilities do not sum up to 1) expected payoffs of PI and PII, given the actions a0 and b0, respectively. Now we are ready to define two sets, B1 and B2, consisting of correlated actions. A distribution Q in A is in B1 if any action a0, assigned a positive probability by Q, is a best response, versus the expected mixed action of PII, among the class of actions that are both indistinguishable from and more informative than itself. Precisely, for all aO, a E ZI satisfying a -a0 and a is more informative than ao.
Notice that if instead of playing a0 PI plays a, his unnormalized payoff is Eb e2Q(aO, b)hl(a, b). B2 is defined in a similar way.
In Definition 1 we required that a0 is a best response among all actions a that satisfy a -aO and that a is more informative than ao. Had we required in Definition 1 only a -ao, namely, that ao is a best response among a greater class of actions ( Notice that under a standard-trivial information structure (like the one just described) two actions are indistinguishable if and only if both yield trivial information regardless of the opponent's action. Moreover, if an action a' is strictly more informative than a, then there is no action indistinguishable from the first.
Let Q be the distribution assigning 3 to each of the pairs (a3, b2), (a2, b2) and (a2, b3). Notice that Q is not a correlated equilibrium in the one-shot game, since PI (resp., PII) can gain by deviating from a3 (resp., b3) to a1 (resp., bl). However, al -a3 and bl, b3. Thus, Q e B n B2. 3.5. Characterization of LCEP. In the case where the information of both players is not trivial the characterization will be done by using Bi, and in the trivial case by using Bi.
THEOREM 1. In two-player games4 the following hold: (i) if both players have nontrivial information, then LCEP = LCEP* = cony h(C1) n conv h(C2) n IR = h(B1) n h(B2) n IR; and (ii) if at least one of the players has trivial information, then LCEP = LCEP* conv h(D1) n conv h(D2) n IR = h(Bl) n h(B2) n IR.
In words, the lower correlated equilibrium payoffs set and the extensive form correlated equilibrium payoffs set coincide. Moreover, in the nontrivial case, they are equal to the set of payoffs associated with a correlated action in B1 and (possibly different) correlated action in B2.
One of the implications of Theorem 1 is:
In other words, the introduction of a mediator to the game does not enlarge the set of lower equilibrium payoffs.
REMARK 3. In a case in which both players have trivial information, LCEP equals the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs of the one-shot game. Thus, LCEP = conv{(0,0), (7,2), (2,7), (6,6)}, which coincides with the feasible and individually rational payoffs. 
Therefore (4.1) is established. It remains to show the converse inclusion. We will
show that LCEP* c h(B1) n h(B2) n IR. Assume to the contrary that U = ((X t= At) X (X 1 B), P, f, g) is an extensive form correlated equilibrium and that the payoff associated with it, (w, w2), lies outside of h(Bl) n h(B2). W.l.o.g. we may assume that (w1, w2) 4 h(B2). We will define a function g (a deviation, according to which PII chooses his pure strategy), which results in a higher payoff for PII. Precisely, T T liminfEf g p (l/T) E x2 > w2.
T t=l
Thereby, we will prove that U is not an equilibrium. The deviation g is described as follows. Instead of playing the prescribed action (defined by g) PII plays the best undetectable deviation. However, the play of PII should be continued in a consistent way, so as not to affect the distribution of PI's signals. Lemma 4 ensures that there exists such a continuation. In order to verify that, indeed, g is a profitable deviation, we show that on a large set of states (Lemma 3), PII increases his expected payoff by at least E > 0 (Lemma 1).
Let K be a straight line that divides the plan into two disjoint parts: K-, the open one, and K+, the closed one. Moreover, assume that (w1, w2) E K-and h(B2) c K+, Denote by Rt the distribution over histories (consisting of messages and joint actions) of length t -1. Recall that together with Rt the functions f and g induce a correlated action to be played at stage t. In other words, the histories and f, g induce a distribution over joint actions. This distribution, denoted by Qt, indicates the probability for any joint action to be played at stage t had the players adhered to (f,g).
The following lemma states that the set of stages t on which Qt is associated with a payoff in K-(far away from h(B2)) is relatively a large set. 
t M, t < Tn
The term in brackets is a convex combination of payoffs in K+, which is in K+ (recall that K+ is convex and closed). Thus, the right side of (4.3) converges to a point in K+. This contradicts (4.2), and the lemma follows. // The following lemma mimics the functions g and g after a certain stage, say, t -1. I is the set of all PI's histories of length t -1 and J, J stand for the set of all PII's histories of the same length. The sample space (I x J, u), where ,u is the probability, defined on I x J, is the distribution over the joint histories induced by the original extensive form correlated equilibrium, U. The sample space (I X J, j) is the one induced by the deviation g. By playing undetectable deviations (in particular, more informative action) in the previous stages, PII did not lose the ability to distinguish between actions of PI. This fact is represented in the lemma by a map, if, between possible histories that correspond to g and actual histories that correspond to g. The conclusion of the lemma is that PII can pretend as if he abides by the prescribed action e (to be played at stage t), while actually he plays e. e will be utilized later in the construction of g. (a', ), (a, 1f) e support(-i), 4(a', 3) = (a', 3) and q(a, y) = (a, 13) The function gn is an improvement of gn-1 in the sense that gn agrees with gnon the first n -1 stages, and it increases PII's payoff without being detectable. Furthermore, at the rest of the stages, gn is a continuation of the play without giving a chance to PI to detect the previous deviation.
(gn)n is defined inductively. Set g l = gl, the original function. Suppose that gj is defined for all j < n. Define g-= g_ for all t < n.
Recall that gn (the nth function of the strategy gn) maps elements consisting of v E L2-1 and a string of messages, p,1..., 1 will be defined as a best response versus kn(v, 1,..., Pn), among all the actions that are indistinguishable from, and more informative than gn_ (v, j1,..., 3n). We will define gn for t > n, using Lemma 4. Let t = n + 1. I is the set of all the gn_1(v, l,. .. , n) (ii) is satisfied and because the former is more informative than the latter, (iii) is implied.
Apply Lemma 4 for e = gn,+1, which is defined on histories of length n, to obtain the function e. e satisfies E,(ela) = E,L(ela) for all a e A. Define + = e.
In words, PII adjusts his behavior. Instead of playing according to gn he plays according to gn+1. However, PI cannot differentiate between the two since both induce the same mixed action, no matter what the history of PI is.
So far we defined gn up to stage n + 1. In order to continue defining gn+2 n+3, . we should repeatedly use Lemma 4. gn+l, just defined, induces, together with f, a distribution over the joint histories. By playing according to gn+1, PII does not lose information, in the sense that a function $i, applied to histories of length n + 1, can be found so as to satisfy hypotheses (i)-(iii) of Lemma 4. Thus, gn+2 can be defined without affecting the distribution PI is expecting (from gni2). In the same way, all the strategy gn is defined, thereby ensuring that Namely, the_expected payoffs after stage n are not changed by gn' Moreover, letting Qn (resp., Qn) denote the probability distribution of the set of joint actions (to be played at stage n) induced by f and g (resp., gn), one obtains (4.5) Qn E BR2(Qn). This is because gn was defined as a best response among all the actions indistinguishable from and more informative than the prescribed one. In other words, It shows that PII has a profitable deviation, g, which establishes the fact that U is not an extensive form correlated equilibrium. Recall that it derives from the assumption that the payoff associated with U is not in h(B2). Thus, we have shown that LCEP* c h(Bl) n h(B2) n IR in the nontrivial case and the proof of Theorem 1 is concluded. // 5. Proof of Theorem 2. We consider here only the nontrivial case; the other case is left to the reader.
The proof will be divided into three steps. In the first one, it is shown that UCEP* c h(B1 n B2) n IR. Since UNIC* c UCEP*, it will provide also a proof to UNIC* c h(B1 n B2) n IR. In the second step it will be shown that CEPL c h(B1 n B2) n IR for every Banach limit L.
The first two steps are proven by the same method. It is assumed, to the contrary, that there is an equilibrium (the one in question) payoff not in h(B1 n B2) n IR. Since any equilibrium payoff should be in IR it can be assumed that the payoff is not in h(B1 n B2). Based on this assumption, a profitable deviation is constructed in the way it has been built in the previous section. The existence of profitable deviation contradicts the fact that the payoff is associated with an equilibrium.
The third step is devoted to the converse direction. It is shown that h(B1 n B2) n IR c UNIC. Since UNIC is the smallest set of correlated equilibrium payoffs mentioned in this paper, this step concludes the proof of the theorem.
Step 1 Hence, g is a profitable deviation which contradicts the assumption saying that U is an equilibrium. We therefore conclude that UCEP* ch(B nB2) n IR.
Step 2 Step 3. h(B1 n B2) n IR c UNIC. The objective is to construct for any Q E B1 n B2 satisfying h(Q) E IR a uniform correlated equilibrium associated with the payoff h(Q). Before going into technical details, I would like to give an informal, textual description of the correlated strategy, defined later. Suppose that before starting the game a mediator draws a joint action in X according to Q, infinitely many times. Each draw is independent of the other. Let the outcomes at the tth draw be denoted by (at, bt). The message for player 1 is (a1, a2,...) and the message for player 2 is  (bl, b2,...) . Suppose, furthermore, that PI plays at at stage t and PII plays bt. Does this generate an equilibrium? Certainly not. The player might have incentives to deviate and disobey the recommendation of the mediator. However, we assumed Q e B1 n B2. Thus, any profitable deviation is either distinguishable from or less informative than the recommended action.
CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA IN TWO-PLAYER REPEATED GAMES
With a slight modification the former correlated strategy would be able to cope with deviations from the assigned actions to distinguishable ones. Such deviations change the distribution of the opponent's signals. Hence, by making tests on the previous signals, a player can detect, with high precision, his opponent's deviations. But for this test, sometimes a player should play some actions outside the support of Q. In other words, in order to detect deviation to an action, distinguishable from the recommended one, a player may need to play actions that are assigned zero probability by Q. For this purpose we modify the way the mediator chooses the messages (a1, a2,...), (b, b2,...) .
Let Q' be a perfectly mixed correlated action, assigning each joint action a positive probability. Furthermore, Q' tends to Q. The pair (a,, b,) is drawn according to Qt independently of the previous draws. PI plays at and PII plays bt at stage t. The players are supposed to check the signals they got and compare it with the expected signals. If a player finds a discrepancy between the two, he should start punishing his opponent for a long period of time and then resume the game from the beginning. Does this form an equilibrium? Still not. The reason is that a player can deviate to an action indistinguishable from, yet less informative than the recommended one.
Say, for instance, that a and a' are two actions of PI, indistinguishable one from the other. Moreover, a is strictly less informative than a'. In other words, PI, by playing a', can distinguish between the actions b and b' of PII, while by playing a he cannot. Suppose that in a certain stage PII knows when PI is supposed to play a', while PI does not know that PII knows it. In this case, PI may deviate to a (he does not suspect that PII will detect it) and thereby lose his ability to distinguish between b and b'. However, if PII plays with probability 2 either b or b', and PI reports to PII (by a method that will be described in the sequel) whether or not he observed the signal corresponding to b or b', PI is going to be mistaken with probability -. This is so because by playing a, PI observes the same signal, no matter if PII plays b or b'. PII knows that PI was supposed to play a' and to be able to report it correctly. Thus, PII, with probability 2, infers that PI has deviated to a less informative action, and he can start punishing PI.
The previous explanation suggests that in a correlated strategy we are about to define, there will be stages in which PII (resp., PI) knows what PI (resp., PII) is supposed to play while PI (resp., PII) does not know that PII (resp., PI) knows it. Moreover, there should be a way to communicate, so that one player will be able to elicit information from the other.
The mediator, instead of drawing (at, bt) from X, draws (at, bt, it), where it E {0, 1, 2. In a case where it = 0, the mediator sends PI and PII the messages at and bt, respectively. However, if it = 1, he informs PI of (at, bt) and PII of bt. If it = 2, he informs PII of (at, bt) and PI of at. In other words, if i, # 0, the player i, knows what his opponent is recommended to act while the latter does not know that player it knows it. Obviously, the majority of the weight (w.r.t. which (at, bt, it) is drawn) should be put on (at, bt, 0). Thus, the additional possible selections of the mediator do not distort the payoffs by much.
How do players communicate? We assume that each player has nontrivial information. Therefore, each player can distinguish between two of his opponent's actions at least. Different combinations of these two actions can encode different reports. The correlated strategy hereby defined will specify who and when should report on what. This should be designed carefully, because the mediator should not reveal to PI on which actions he will have to report. This information will be disclosed only to PII. When the time comes, PII will announce (by a special combination of actions) what stage PI should report on. The uncertainty about the stage on which PI will have to report will prevent him from deviating at all stages. In the second half of the second phase, PI chooses a random stage from Mk e(l), denoted by tj e(II), and reports on it to PII. This is done by playing mk times either vu or vr with probability 2 each, while PII plays u2.
In the third phase, PI reports on the signal he received at stage ti e(I) and PII reports on the signal of the stage t e(II).
How to report on a signal? There are finitely many possible signals. Each of them can be encoded by a finite string of two different symbols. In any stage of the first part of M'e(), PII plays u2 while PI plays either v1 or v\, so as to transmit the string consisting of 12(vl, u2) and 12(vr, u2) which encodes the symbol he (PI) has received in the stage tk' e(1). In other words, at the end of the first portion of Mk e(3), PII can look at the string of the signals he received in Mk,'e(3) and infer about the identity of the signal on which PI reported.
Similarly, PII reports to PI on his signal. Namely, while PI plays u1, PII plays sequentially either v2 or vr according to the string encoding the signal PII received at the stage t, e(II).
Denote the signal reported to PI (resp., PII) by PII (resp., PI) as sk e(II) (resp., s e(I)). To sum up, after the last stage of Me(3), PI knows tha P tt PII reported on k e(II) as the signal he received at stage t ke(11), and PII knows that PI reported on sij, e(I) as ig of the signal of the stage (). Both players can check whether these reports are consistent with the strategies and with the actions they played in ti e(I) and tki e(II.
When no ambiguity arises, we denote ) by t(I) b ) and t], e(II) by t(II).
The report of PII is inconsistent if at(II) = (a,t(I), bt(II)), i.e., PI knows that PII is supposed to play bt(II) at stage t(II) and In such a case, PII ascribes a deviation in Mk e to PI. To recapitulate, PI attributes a deviation in Mk e to PII if either (5.3) or (5.4a) holds. In this case, PI should punish PII by playing the mixed action that "minmaxes" PII. Notice that in our model of deterministic signalling, a player ascribes a deviation to his opponent only when the latter had, indeed, deviated.
We will denote the strategies defined above by U = (A x B, P, a, r), where A and B are the sets of the strings (a1, a2,...) and (i1, ,2,. ..), respectively; P is the probability measure induced by the random selection of the mediator described above and U, r are the strategies of PI and PII, respectively.
In what follows we show that the payoff associated with U is h(Q) and that U is a uniform equilibrium. The next proposition shows the first assertion. PROOF. Suppose that both players adhere to the strategies described above. In that case a deviation is detected with probability 0. Thus the expected payoff at time t is close to h(Q) up to 211//k (recall that Qk assigns a total probability of 21I1/k to points out of E). This concludes the proof. // In the next proposition it is proven that U is a uniform correlated equilibrium. It cannot be assumed that an action of a player at one stage is independent of previous ones. Therefore, we need the following generalization of Chebyshev inequality, which is quoted from [Ll]. 
